

The Director of Central Intelligence Executive Registry

Washington, D.C. 20505


84 - 264

12 January 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDCI

FROM: DCI

Attached fyi.


William J. Casey

Attachment:
Presidential Address:
National Press Club
dated January 9, 1984

(NSC/Myer/BE/RR)

January 9, 1984

11:00 a.m.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB

Thank you very much for inviting me back to visit your distinguished group. I'm grateful for this opportunity during these first days of 1984, to speak through you to the people of the world on a subject of great importance to the cause of peace -- relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In just a few days, the United States will join the Soviet Union and the other nations of Europe at an international security conference in Stockholm. We intend to uphold our responsibility as a major power in easing potential sources of conflict. The conference will search for practical and meaningful ways to increase European security and preserve peace. We will go to Stockholm bearing the heartfelt wishes of our people for genuine progress.

We live in a time of challenges to peace, but also of opportunities for peace. Through decades of difficulty and frustration, America's highest aspiration has never wavered: We have and will continue to struggle for a lasting peace that enhances dignity for men and women everywhere. I believe 1984 finds the United States in its strongest position in years to establish a constructive and realistic working relationship with the Soviet Union.

Some fundamental changes have taken place since the decade of the seventies -- years when the United States questioned its

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role in the world and neglected its defenses, while the Soviet Union increased its military might and sought to expand its influence through threats and use of force.

Three years ago we embraced a mandate from the American people to change course, and we have. Today America can once again demonstrate, with equal conviction, our commitment to stay secure and to find peaceful solutions to problems through negotiations. January 1984 is a time of opportunities for peace.

History teaches that wars begin when governments believe the price of aggression is cheap. To keep the peace, we and our allies must remain strong enough to convince any potential aggressor that war could bring no benefit, only disaster. In other words, our goal is deterrence, plain and simple.

With the support of the American people and the Congress, we halted America's decline. Our economy is in the midst of the best recovery since the sixties. Our defenses are being rebuilt. Our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our values has never been more clear. There is credibility and consistency.

America's recovery may have taken Soviet leaders by surprise. They may have counted on us to keep weakening ourselves. They have been saying for years that our demise was inevitable. They said it so often they probably started believing it. I think they can see now they were wrong.

Neither we nor the Soviet Union can wish away the differences between our two societies. But we should always remember that we do have common interests. And the foremost among them is to avoid war and reduce the level of arms. There

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is no rational alternative but to steer a course which I would call credible deterrence and peaceful competition; and if we do so, we might find areas in which we could engage in constructive cooperation.

Recently we've been hearing some very strident rhetoric from the Kremlin. These harsh words have led some to speak of heightened uncertainty and an increased danger of conflict. This is understandable, but profoundly mistaken. Look beyond the words, and one fact stands out plainly: Deterrence is being restored and it is making the world a safer place; safer because there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will underestimate our strength or resolve.

We do not threaten the Soviet Union. Freedom poses no threat, it is the language of progress. We proved this 35 years ago when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, and could have dominated the world. But we didn't. Instead we used our power to write a new chapter in the history of mankind. We helped rebuild the war-ravaged economies of East and West, including those nations who had been our enemies. Indeed, those former enemies are now numbered among our staunchest friends.

America's character has not changed. Our strength and vision of progress provide the basis for stability and meaningful negotiations. Soviet leaders know it makes sense to compromise only if they can get something in return. America's economic and military strength permit us to offer something in return. Yes, today is a time of opportunities for peace.

But to say that the world is safer is not to say that it is safe enough. We are witnessing tragic conflicts in many parts of the world. Nuclear arsenals are far too high. And our working relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it must be. These are conditions which must be addressed and improved.

Deterrence is essential to preserve peace and protect our way of life, but deterrence is not the beginning and end of our policy toward the Soviet Union. We must and will engage the Soviets in a dialogue as cordial and cooperative as possible, a dialogue that will serve to promote peace in the troubled regions of the world, reduce the level of arms, and build a constructive working relationship.

First, we must find ways to eliminate the use and threat of force in solving international disputes.

The world has witnessed more than 150 conflicts since the end of World War II alone. Armed conflicts are raging in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Africa. In other regions, independent nations are confronted by heavily armed neighbors seeking to dominate by threatening attack or subversion.

Most of these conflicts have their roots in local problems, but many have been fanned and exploited by the Soviet Union and its surrogates -- and, of course, Afghanistan has suffered an outright Soviet invasion. Fueling regional conflicts and exporting revolution only exacerbates local conflicts, increases suffering, and makes solutions to real social and economic problems more difficult.

Would it not be better and safer to assist the peoples and governments in areas of conflict in negotiating peaceful solutions? Today, I am asking the Soviet leaders to join with us in cooperative efforts to move the world in this safer direction.

Second, our aim is to find ways to reduce the vast stockpiles of armaments in the world, particularly nuclear weapons.

It is tragic to see the world's developing nations spending more than \$150 billion a year on arms -- almost 20 percent of their national budgets. We must find ways to reverse the vicious cycle of threat and response which drives arms races everywhere it occurs.

While modernizing our defenses, we have done only what is needed to establish a stable military balance. The simple truth is, America's total nuclear stockpile has declined. We have fewer warheads today than we had 28 years ago. And our nuclear stockpile is at the lowest level in 25 years in terms of its total destructive power.

Just 2 months ago, we and our allies agreed to withdraw an additional 1,400 nuclear warheads from Western Europe. This comes after the removal of a thousand nuclear warheads from Europe over the last 3 years. Even if all our planned intermediate-range missiles have to be deployed in Europe over the next 5 years -- and we hope this will not be necessary -- we will have eliminated five existing warheads for each new warhead deployed.

But this is not enough. We must accelerate our efforts to reach agreements to reduce greatly the numbers of nuclear weapons. It was with this goal in mind that I first proposed here, in November 1981, the "zero option" for intermediate-range missiles. Our aim was then and is now to eliminate in one fell swoop an entire class of nuclear arms. Although NATO's initial deployment of INF missiles was an important achievement, I would still prefer that there be no INF missile deployments on either side. Indeed, I support a zero option for all nuclear arms. As I have said before, my dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.

Last month, the Soviet Defense Minister stated that his country shares the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. These are encouraging words. Well, now is a time to move from words to deeds.

Our third aim is to work with the Soviet Union to establish a better working relationship with greater cooperation and understanding.

Cooperation and understanding are built on deeds, not words. Complying with agreements helps; violating them hurts. Respecting the rights of individual citizens bolsters the relationship; denying these rights harms it. Expanding contacts across borders and permitting a free interchange of information and ideas increase confidence; sealing off one's people from the rest of the world reduces it. Peaceful trade helps, while organized theft of industrial secrets certainly hurts.

These examples illustrate clearly why our relationship with the Soviet Union is not what it should be. We have a long way to go, but we are determined to try and try again.

In working toward these goals, our approach is based on three guiding principles: realism, strength, and dialogue.

Realism means we start by understanding the world we live in. We must recognize that we are in a long-term competition with a government that does not share our notions of individual liberties at home and peaceful change abroad. We must be frank in acknowledging our differences and unafraid to promote our values.

Strength means we know we cannot negotiate successfully or protect our interests if we are weak. Our strength is necessary not only to deter war, but to facilitate negotiation and compromise.

Strength is more than military power. Economic strength is crucial and America's economy is leading the world into recovery. Equally important is unity among our people at home and with our allies abroad. We are stronger in all these areas than we were 3 years ago.

Dialogue means we are determined to deal with our differences peacefully, through negotiation. We are prepared to discuss all the problems that divide us, and to work for practical, fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise. We will never retreat from negotiations.

I have openly expressed my view of the Soviet system. I don't know why this should come as a surprise to Soviet leaders

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who have never shied away from expressing their view of our system. But this does not mean we can't deal with each other. We don't refuse to talk when the Soviets call us "imperialist aggressors" and worse, or because they cling to the fantasy of a communist triumph over democracy. The fact that neither of us likes the other's system is no reason to refuse to talk. Living in this nuclear age makes it imperative that we do talk.

Our commitment to dialogue is firm and unshakeable. But we insist that our negotiations deal with real problems, not atmospherics.

In our approach to negotiations, reducing the risk of war -- and especially nuclear war -- is priority number one. A nuclear confrontation could well be mankind's last. The comprehensive set of initiatives that we have proposed would reduce substantially the size of nuclear arsenals. And again, I would hope that in the years ahead we could go much further toward the ultimate goal of ridding our planet of the nuclear threat altogether.

The world regrets -- certainly we do -- that the Soviet Union broke off negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has refused to set a date for further talks on strategic arms. Our negotiators are ready to return to the negotiating table, and to conclude agreements in INF and START. We will negotiate in good faith. Whenever the Soviet Union is ready to do likewise, we will meet them half way.

We seek not only to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons, but also to reduce the chances for dangerous misunderstanding and

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miscalculation. So we have put forward proposals for what we call "confidence-building measures." They cover a wide range of activities. In the Geneva negotiations, we have proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union exchange advance notifications of missile tests and major military exercises. Following up on congressional suggestions, we also proposed a number of ways to improve direct U.S.-Soviet channels of communication.

These bilateral proposals will be broadened at the conference in Stockholm. We are working with our allies to develop practical, meaningful ways to reduce the uncertainty and potential for misinterpretation surrounding military activities, and to diminish the risks of surprise attack.

Arms control has long been the most visible area of U.S.-Soviet dialogue. But a durable peace also requires us to defuse tensions and regional conflicts. We and the Soviets should have a common interest in promoting regional stability, and in finding peaceful solutions to existing conflicts that permit developing nations to concentrate their energies on economic growth. Thus we seek to engage the Soviets in exchanges of views on these regional conflicts and tensions and on how we can both contribute to stability and a lowering of tensions.

We remain convinced that on issues like these it is in the Soviet Union's best interest to cooperate in achieving broad-based, negotiated solutions. If the Soviet leaders make that choice, they will find us ready to cooperate.

Another major problem in our relationship with the Soviet Union is human rights. Soviet practices in this area, as much as

any other issue, have created the mistrust and ill will that hangs over our relationship.

Moral considerations alone compel us to express our deep concern over prisoners of conscience in the Soviet Union, over the virtual halt in the emigration of Jews, Armenians, and others who wish to join their families abroad, and over the continuing harrassment of courageous people like Andrei Sakharov.

Our request is simple and straightforward: That the Soviet Union live up to the obligations it has freely assumed under international covenants -- in particular, its commitments under the Helsinki Accords. Experience has shown that greater respect for human rights can contribute to progress in other areas of the Soviet-American relationship.

Conflicts of interest between the United States and the Soviet Union are real. But we can and must keep the peace between our two nations and make it a better and more peaceful world for all mankind.

These are the objectives of our policy toward the Soviet Union, a policy of credible deterrence and peaceful competition that will serve both nations and people everywhere for the long haul. It is a challenge for Americans. It is also a challenge for the Soviets. If they cannot meet us half way, we will be prepared to protect our interests, and those of our friends and allies. But we want more than deterrence; we seek genuine cooperation; we seek progress for peace.

Cooperation begins with communication. We seek such communication. We will stay at the negotiating tables in Geneva

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and Vienna. Furthermore, Secretary Shultz will be meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm. This meeting should be followed by others, so that high-level consultations become a regular and normal component of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Our challenge is peaceful. It will bring out the best in us. It also calls for the best from the Soviet Union. No one can predict how the Soviet leaders will respond to our challenge. But the people of our two countries share with all mankind the dream of eliminating the risks of nuclear war. It is not an impossible dream, because eliminating those is so clearly a vital interest for all of us. Our 2 countries have never fought each other; there is no reason we ever should. Indeed, we have fought alongside one another in 2 world wars. Today our common enemies are hunger, disease, ignorance and, above all, war.

More than 20 years ago, President Kennedy defined an approach that is as realistic and hopeful today as when he announced it:

"So, let us not be blind to our differences" he said, "but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved."

Well, those differences would turn out to be differences in governmental structure and philosophy. The common interest would have to do with the things of everyday life for people everywhere.

Suppose Ivan and Anya found themselves in a waiting room, or sharing a shelter from the rain with Jim and Sally, and there was no language barrier to keep them from getting acquainted. Would they debate the differences between their respective governments?

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Or, would Anya and Sally find themselves comparing notes about their children, while Ivan and Jim found out what each other did for a living?

Before they parted company they would probably have touched on ambitions, hobbies, what they wanted for their children and the problems of making ends meet. And as they went their separate ways, Anya would be saying to Ivan, "wasn't she nice, she gave me a new recipe." Jim would be telling Sally what Ivan did or didn't like about his boss. They might even have decided they were all going to get together for dinner some evening soon.

Above all, they would have proven that people don't make wars. People want to raise their children in a world without fear, and without war. They want to have some of the good things over and above bare subsistence that make life worth living. They want to work at some craft, trade or profession that gives them satisfaction and a sense of worth. Their common interests cross all borders.

If the Soviet Government wants peace, then there will be peace. Together we can strengthen peace, reduce the level of arms and know in doing so we have fulfilled the hopes and dreams of those we represent and indeed of people everywhere. Let us begin now.